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Russia’s economic performance in the last 15 years has surprised 
observers at least three times. First was the Russian economic mir-
acle of 1999–2008. According to the International Monetary Fund’s 
World Economic Outlook, over these 10 years, Russia’s per-capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) doubled in constant prices (equivalent to 
the average annual growth rate of 7 percent) and grew sixfold in nom-
inal dollars—from $270 billion to $1.7 trillion in current prices.1 
The second surprise was the catastrophic performance in 2008–
09 during the global economic crisis. In 2009, Russia’s GDP col-
lapsed by 8 percent, more than that of any other large economy. 
Finally is the recent economic slowdown turned crisis. After the 
Russian economy seemingly recovered from the global economic 
crisis—growing at 4 percent per year in 2010 and 2011—it started 
to stagnate. Even before the annexation of Crimea, Russian eco-
nomic growth had slowed to zero. Despite solid macroeconomic 
fundamentals, robust growth in the US and China, better-than- 
expected performance of the eurozone economy, high oil prices, 
and the return of political stability under President Vladimir Putin 
(who promised serious pro-business reforms), the Russian economy 
stopped growing. 
In this paper, I will not discuss the first two episodes.2 Instead, 
I will focus on the postcrisis slowdown, which mushroomed into 
the current crisis. My goal is to explain the origins of the slowdown, 
understand its political implications, and analyze its interaction with 
the 2014 crisis in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.
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I will first state that the economic miracle preceding the crisis was 
real—and so is the current slowdown. Second, I will show that the 
only explanation of the latter is the poor investment climate, which 
is an essential part of the current political equilibrium. Third, I will 
speculate that current economic conditions imply the need to depart 
from the social contract that prevailed during the economic miracle 
years. This social contract presumed that the public would give up 
its political freedoms in exchange for economic growth. The slow-
down effectively destroyed this contract and, in doing so, may have 
contributed to the decision to turn to imperial ideology and territo-
rial expansion. Finally, I will try to forecast what all of this means for 
the Russian economy and the world.
Russian Economic Miracle—and the New Stagnation
In 1995, Daniel Yergin and Thane Gustafson wrote a book that con-
tained three scenarios for Russia in 2010.3 One of the scenarios was 
chudo (Russian for “miracle”). Another scenario included rebellions 
in frontier regions and ultimate disintegration, while the third sce-
nario foresaw a grim military dictatorship bent on expansion. 
As often happens, real life turned out to be a mix of the three sce-
narios. In terms of domestic and external politics, Russia eventually 
followed the latter two scenarios. On the other hand, the economic 
performance of 1999–2008 was indeed miraculous from both an 
international and historical perspective.4 Despite the beating deliv-
ered by the global economic crisis, Russia was officially classified 
by the World Bank in 2013 as a high-income economy and was 
on track to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD, “the club of developed countries”). 
As my focus here is the slowdown rather than the miracle, 
I will need only to rely on the following two takeaways from my 
and Aleh Tsyvinski’s analysis of the miracle years. First, this 1999–
2008 growth was indeed impressive and trickled down to all parts 
of Russian society. Second, the sources of this growth—growth in 
commodity prices, cheap and abundant labor, underutilized pro-
duction capacity, low-hanging fruit of macroeconomic stabilization, 
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and first-generation institutional reforms of the 1990s and early 
2000s—were by and large exhausted by 2008. Therefore, to con-
tinue the growth after the crisis, Russia needed to carry out substan-
tial reforms to improve the protection of property rights, rule of law, 
and competition. 
These reforms have not happened. After the postcrisis recovery, 
Russian growth rates fell substantially. Figure 1 presents quarterly 
GDP growth data, which show that the slowdown started in 2012. 
During the recovery in 2010 and 2011, the growth rates were above 
4 percent, but in the second half of 2012 they fell to just 2 percent. 
The official GDP growth in 2013 was just 1.3 percent. The forecasts 
for the first half of 2014 entered negative territory even before the 
Crimean crisis.
One of the most interesting features of this slowdown is that it 
was a surprise to many observers. The World Economic Outlook, the 
Figure 1
russian GdP Growth, QuartErly data (yEar-ovEr-yEar) 
Sources: New Economic School and Renaissance Capital, RenCap-NES Macro Mon-
itor: Russia (April 2014).
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flagship biannual publication of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), consistently predicted the 3–4 percent growth in 2013 up 
until October 2013, when it reduced its forecast to 1.5 percent. (See 
figure 2.) Even though the slowdown started in the second half of 
2012—right after Vladimir Putin returned as president after Dmitry 
Medvedev’s one term in office—the IMF was still predicting growth 
as high as 3.4 percent as recently as April 2013. 
The IMF was certainly not alone—the 3–4 percent expected 
growth was the official forecast made by the Russian Ministry of the 
Economic Development that was revised only in Spring 2013. In Jan-
uary 2013, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev actually expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the fact that the growth forecast was too low and 
said that Russia needed 5 percent growth per year for the years to 
come. This is not a coincidence: in his programmatic January 2012 
article “We Need a New Economy” and in his first economic decree 
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Figure 2
russian Economic Growth in 2013 as forEcastEd 
by thE intErnational monEtary fund
Source: World Economic Outlook (2009–14).
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(no. 596), signed on his inauguration day, May 7, 2012, newly elected 
President Putin made a number of promises for the 2012–18 presi-
dential term, all based on the 5–6 percent growth goal. 
Only in the Fall 2013 did long-term stagnation become the essen-
tial part of the mainstream economic forecast. In October 2013, 
Minister of Economic Development Alexei Ulyukaev spoke of the 
baseline scenario of 2–3 percent annual growth for the years to 
come. And in May 2014 he finally acknowledged that Russia was in 
a “technical recession” (negative growth in two quarters in a row).5
Why a Slowdown?
Why has Russian growth slowed down? Initially, the 2012–13 decline 
was blamed on the business cycle. The narrative was that the Russian 
economy was below its potential steady-state growth rate; hence, 
the government needed to increase spending to support weak aggre-
gate demand. However, this explanation was not consistent with the 
data. Contrary to the textbook description of an economy in reces-
sion, the Russian economy was characterized by low unemployment 
(5.0–5.5 percent), high inflation (exceeding the official target of 6.0 
percent), booming consumer credit (by 40 percent in 2012 and 30 
percent in 2013), and robust growth in consumption (7.0 percent in 
2012 and 3.5 percent in 2013). 
These data eventually debunked the cyclical explanation, and the 
government recognized the structural nature of the slowdown. Yet, 
initially, it preferred to blame the structural problems on external fac-
tors. There have been two versions of this argument. First, the “West 
is weak” version argued that the Russian economy is strongly inte-
grated into the global economy and therefore suffers from the crisis 
in the global economy and, in particular, in the West. The second 
version, on the contrary, was based on the “West is strong” theory: 
the West was not weak but was jealous and hostile to Russia and 
used its strength to undermine Russia’s reputation and, eventually, 
Russia’s successful development. Putin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov 
formulated it in the following terms: “strong, successful, wealthy and 
healthy—such as we are now—are often disliked by others.”6
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The first argument, relating the weakness of the Russian economy 
to that of the West, is also not consistent with the data. Unlike 2011 
and the beginning of 2012, when the US and Europe indeed con-
tinued to struggle after the crisis, in the end of 2012 and in 2013, 
the US economy embarked on a solid recovery. While the Euro-
pean economy was and is still weak, it is doing much better than 
could have been expected in mid-2012 when the Russian slowdown 
started. Finally, none of the major emerging market economies had a 
substantial slowdown in 2013; most of them actually had a growth 
acceleration, and so did the global economy as a whole. Not surpris-
ingly, oil prices remained at historically high levels.
The second argument is essentially a conspiracy theory and by 
definition cannot be refuted by data. It is, however, unlikely that we 
would have learned nothing about such an anti-Russian economic 
plan after Edward Snowden’s and other leaks. Eventually even Putin 
himself, in his annual address to the Russian Parliament in December 
2013, did acknowledge, “Let’s be frank: the main reasons for the slow-
down in our economy are internal rather than external in nature.”7
What were the internal problems? Unlike its OECD counterparts, 
Russia was not suffering from a debt crisis. During the miracle years, 
Russia paid off virtually all foreign debt and even accumulated fiscal 
reserves. Currently, Russia’s sovereign debt stands only at 10 percent 
of its GDP, and its two sovereign wealth funds (the Reserve Fund 
and the National Welfare Fund) add up to $185 billion, also about 
10 percent of GDP. 
Therefore, we cannot explain the slowdown by Russia’s macro-
economic problems. Figure 3 shows that the main source of Rus-
sia’s economic decline was the fall of investment. Although the other 
components of Russia’s GDP did not fall or recovered after the crisis, 
investment is still below its 2008 peak. This simple fact pinpoints 
a very intuitive explanation for the slowdown: Russia is no longer 
attractive for investors, neither foreign nor Russian. This explanation 
is also consistent with the fact that Russia experienced a net capital 
outflow of 3 percent of its GDP in 2012 and 2013. Also, Russian 
stocks were traded at about a 50 percent discount to other emerging 
markets even before Crimea.
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The investors are leaving Russia for a very simple reason: Russia’s 
investment climate (the rule of law and protection of investors’ rights) 
is very poor—at least relative to competing capital destinations. For 
a high-income, urbanized, and educated country, Russia is unusually 
corrupt. Figure 4 shows corruption and level of development around 
the world. In this graph, Russia is one standard deviation more cor-
rupt than the countries with a similar level of development (East 
European and Latin American countries). The level of corruption in 
Russia is on par with that of the poorest countries in the world.
The unusually high level of corruption in Russia is hardly news 
to investors or to the Russian government. In particular, Putin 
flagged the investment climate and corruption in 2012 as the most 
important barriers to economic growth. However, what is new is the 
Figure 3
dynamics of russian GdP and its comPonEnts in 2003–13 
Note: Quarterly data, 2008 constant prices. 
Source: Rosstat.
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Russian government’s complete inability or unwillingness to tackle 
these problems and, consequently, investors’ ultimate disillusion-
ment with government promises. Now that other sources of growth 
such as rising commodity prices, cheap labor, and spare produc-
tion capacity have been exhausted, growth in investment is unlikely 
without reform, and therefore, stagnation is inevitable.
Given that the government has recognized and discussed this so 
many times, why does Russia not reform? It is not because the gov-
ernment does not know what to do. The very same government has 
written many reform programs—from Gref Program 2001–2010 to 
Strategy 2020 and Putin’s May 7, 2012, presidential decrees. How-
ever, these institutional reforms are now contrary to the interests of 
Figure 4
PEr-caPita GdP and control of corruPtion (2012)
Note: The line represents a nonparametric trend. Control of corruption is higher in 
less-corrupt countries. 
Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, and author’s calculations.
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the ruling elite. Rule of law and fighting corruption constrain the 
elite’s ability to extract rents from the economy and, thus, to hold on 
to power. Although these reforms are likely to result in faster GDP 
growth and prosperity for the whole country, they will reduce the 
incumbent elite’s ability to enjoy this prosperity. 
Indeed, even if the opposition promises to preserve today’s elites’ 
wealth after the change of political power, it is not clear how the 
opposition could credibly commit to respecting this promise. This 
conundrum is formulated by Daron Acemoglu as the absence of the 
Political Coase Theorem.8 Politics are different from the corporate 
world, where the more efficient investor can take over an ineffi-
cient company by simply paying out the existing shareholders (the 
economic version of the Coase Theorem). By definition, in politics, 
there is no external enforcement of contracts between outgoing and 
incoming elites, especially in countries without strong and legitimate 
political and legal institutions. In such countries, the enforcement 
ultimately depends on the party in power. 
This problem is the key explanation of the Russian elite’s pref-
erence for the status quo. The elite chooses to avoid institutional 
reforms that may raise the probability of political transition. More-
over, high oil prices, and therefore substantial resource rents, further 
increase aversion to reforms by making incentives for staying in con-
trol even higher.
The situation is therefore very close to the Brezhnevist zastoi (lit-
erally, “stagnation”), the last period of Soviet history when high oil 
prices resulted in a lack of economic dynamism in the Soviet Union. 
Important economic reforms were delayed, economic growth dis-
appeared, and once oil prices went down in the mid-1980s—the 
Soviet Union went bankrupt and disintegrated.9 
Tsyvinski and I predicted that these risks may materialize in post-
crisis Russia as well and described a “70–80” scenario.10 When oil 
prices were at $40 per barrel, we argued that if prices would rise back 
to $70–80 per barrel, then Russia would return to a 1970s–1980s 
style of stagnation, with Putin’s approval ratings at 70–80 percent 
because of the spending of the petrodollars, but necessary reforms 
would be forgone. We made only a quantitative mistake in not 
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foreseeing that the price of oil would recover all the way to $100 
per barrel. Otherwise, the elite’s effort at preserving Russia’s polit-
ical equilibrium is exactly like the 70–80 scenario predicted: high 
oil prices ensure sufficient rents for the elite to support the status 
quo, while promarket reforms would result in higher political and 
economic competition, increasing the likelihood of political change.
To sum up, the most plausible explanation of the slowdown is 
the deterioration of Russia’s investment climate, which in turn is an 
essential part of maintaining a no-reform political equilibrium.
Political Implications of the Stagnation
The economic stagnation has dramatic implications for the relations 
between the elites and public in Russia. Daniel Treisman carried out 
an empirical analysis of Russian monthly opinion polls for the Yeltsin 
and Putin years and showed that Russians’ support for the incum-
bent president closely correlates with their perception of economic 
performance.11 This analysis sheds light on the social contract of the 
miracle years. The government was corrupt and not accountable to 
the public. At the same time, the people were content with the mate-
rial benefits afforded by the economic growth; therefore, only mod-
erate censorship and repression were needed for the government to 
remain in power.
However, the very same argument implies that the 70–80 scenario 
is not sustainable in the long run. The lack of institutional reforms 
and proliferation of corruption destroy investment and growth, driv-
ing down public support for the regime. Therefore, the social con-
tract of the miracle years is no longer feasible. To stay in power, the 
government has to choose one of two options. First, it can drasti-
cally increase transparency and accountability or follow the reform 
path, which is not consistent with the political imperatives of staying 
in power. The second option is to come up with a new ideology 
worth economic hardship or to drastically increase censorship and 
repression. The last of Yergin and Gustafson’s scenarios—the “grim 
military dictatorship bent for territorial expansion”—is certainly the 
most obvious solution for this problem.12 
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We still do not fully understand why Russia decided to annex 
Crimea. Yet, this discussion implies that the economic slowdown is 
certainly one of the possible explanations—or, at least, a major con-
tributing factor. In the end, very much in line with the government’s 
expectations, the aggression in Ukraine did distract the public from 
the economic slowdown and raised Putin’s approval ratings.
What Next?
The Ukrainian adventure has had a substantial impact on Russian 
economy. Although the direct cost of supporting Crimea is just sev-
eral billions dollars a year (less than half a percent of Russia’s GDP), 
the threat of potential sanctions immediately affected investors’ 
willingness to invest in Russia. Capital outflow accelerated (as of 
September 2014, the official forecast for 2014 net capital flight is 
an unprecedented $100 billion, or more than 5 percent of annual 
GDP), the ruble fell to record lows against the dollar and the euro, 
and stagnation turned into a recession. In this sense, the sanctions 
hit the Russian economy in the most painful way: they aggravated 
country’s most severe economic problem—the deteriorating invest-
ment climate. 
The Ukrainian crisis also showed both foreign and Russian 
investors that investment and economic growth are not a top pri-
ority for the Russian government. Even though the government 
understood that the annexation of Crimea and further escalation 
in eastern Ukraine would result in international isolation and 
substantial costs from sanctions, it still made this decision. This 
has demonstrated that the Russian elite prefer to remain in power 
through imperialistic and nationalist ideology even if the latter is 
very costly to the economy.
This strategy, however, can work only if the citizens are not suf-
ficiently informed about the economic costs—especially, about 
the long-term economic costs. This is why the aggression against 
Ukraine had to be accompanied by increased censorship and repres-
sion. The government stepped up censorship of the Internet and, 
especially, the blogosphere. The state also continued to harass the 
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key opposition leaders who disseminated information critical of the 
government.
Can such a system last until 2018, the end of Putin’s current term 
in office? There are examples of nondemocratic regimes with cen-
sorship and repression that lasted not just for several years but for 
several decades. On one hand, Russia is rather rich, highly educated, 
and urbanized, so it is hard to control the dissemination of infor-
mation and the activities of the political opposition. On the other 
hand, the regime is still powerful enough to bribe (or, if needed, 
intimidate) opposition political leaders within the country or in 
small countries outside Russia. So the system may indeed last for a 
long time. What is clear, however, is that continuation of the current 
political equilibrium will involve censorship and repression and will 
have a substantial negative impact on economic performance.
Another important tool of the regime in the coming years will 
continue to be its aggressive foreign policy. Economic hardship will 
be easier to justify in the presence of external enemies. In this sense, 
it is not impossible to have another Crimea, especially if the eco-
nomic situation worsens. 
Therefore, it is quite possible to foresee Russia in 2018 being a 
corrupt nondemocratic regime with a stagnating economy and 
aggressive foreign policy. On the other hand, nondemocratic regimes 
can fall apart overnight because of internal conflict among the elite 
or protests against economic hardships. The former is not impossible 
given that individual sanctions do impose tangible costs on mem-
bers of the elite. The latter is also likely if the price of oil falls, or at 
least does not rise, and the government runs out of reserves.
Conclusions
I have argued that the Russian economic slowdown was a natural 
implication of the political equilibrium in which elites prefer the sta-
tus quo to institutional reforms. Although the reforms would result 
in a better investment climate and, therefore, economic growth, 
they would also endanger the elites’ hold on power. Given the high 
resource rents and the resulting high stakes of staying in power, it 
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is not surprising that the Russian government preferred to continue 
with the status quo, in which corruption and expansion of state 
companies and politically connected businesspeople resulted in cap-
ital flight, reduced investment, and stagnation. 
The slowdown has contributed to changes in domestic and for-
eign politics. Once economic growth was gone, the government 
could no longer rely on the social contract of 2000s, in which the 
elites were opportunistic, unaccountable, and corrupt but deliv-
ered material benefits to the public. Therefore, it had to come up 
with a new ideology or, at least, a reason to support the government 
that failed to produce economic growth. Annexing Crimea, and the 
accompanying imperialistic and nationalist discourse, are certainly a 
convenient distraction from Russia’s economic problems. 
The economic implications of the Crimean annexation and the 
larger Ukrainian crisis are substantial. The direct costs of military 
operations and the support of the Crimean economy are limited and 
certainly affordable, and the immediate shock of the first rounds of 
sanctions is much more important, as reflected in the weaker ruble, 
intensified capital flight, and lower stock prices. However, the most 
important consequences will be felt in the longer term by both the 
Russian economy and Russian citizens.
The Crimean adventure has shown the world that Russia’s eco-
nomic development and its integration into the global economy are 
a second-order priority for the Russian elite and can certainly be sac-
rificed if the regime feels threatened. In the long run, this will under-
mine investor confidence and remove the plausibility of restoring 
economic growth in Russia. Russian economic performance may still 
temporarily improve—for example, in the form of another oil price 
surge. However, long-term economic growth is unlikely to return, at 
least until a political transition takes place. 
Notes
This paper is partially based on the Harriman Lecture delivered at the Har-
riman Institute at Columbia University on February 12, 2014.
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Four Russias and a New Political Reality
NATALIA ZUBAREVICH
The economic and social differentiation in Russia is marked and per-
sistent. In addition to regional differences, we see even more pro-
nounced differences in the quality and way of life and the sets of 
values among four groups: populations in large, medium, and small 
cities and in rural Russia.
Center-Periphery Model of Russian Space:  
Four Diverging Russias 
The basis of the center-periphery model is a hierarchy of dwellings—
from the more modernized large cities to patriarchal rural areas.
“Russia One” is composed of major cities. The cities with pop-
ulations of a million or more and those approaching them in size 
account for 21 percent of Russia’s total population, or 31 percent if 
cities with half a million residents are included. The proportion of 
those living in large cities has been steadily rising due to an influx 
of migrants. 
The leaders of Russia One are federal cities with 
• A postindustrial economic structure; 
• A high level of economic development; 
• The highest share of middle-class individuals (30–40 percent 
of the population1); 
• Well-educated individuals (in Moscow and St. Petersburg, 
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39–43 percent of the residents over the age of 15 hold advanced 
university degrees); 
• A larger percentage of residents employed in the small-business 
sector; and 
• High Internet penetration. 
It is in the federal cities—particularly in Moscow, where financial 
and human resources of the entire country are concentrated because 
of the city’s status as the nation’s capital—that political transforma-
tions have proceeded faster and a growing protest sentiment has 
been accompanied by demands for government modernization. 
Electoral data also bear this out: in the September 2013 Moscow 
mayoral election, the opposition candidate collected 27 percent of 
the votes, and during the 2012 presidential elections, less than one-
half of Muscovites voted for Vladimir Putin. 
Postindustrial transformation of the economy and society has 
proceeded at varying rates in other million-strong cities. Progress 
has been faster in Yekaterinburg and Novosibirsk, as these cit-
ies have the appeal of being macroregional centers in the Urals 
and Siberia and are also examples of faster transition from the 
industrial economy to the postindustrial stage. These cities pull in 
more migrants as they offer more well-paid and modern jobs. The 
people’s social environment and political preferences have been 
changing more slowly in million-plus-population cities that have 
kept their Soviet-era industrial specialization, such as Omsk, Ufa, 
and Volgograd. 
Progress has been even slower in cities with a population between 
500,000 and 1 million, particularly those with lower education levels 
and household incomes and with a higher percentage of the work-
force employed in the public sector and industry. But even within 
this group, the differences are large: Tomsk, a university city with a 
population of 500,000, is well ahead of many larger cities in terms of 
modernization. Virtually all cities with a population of 500,000 are 
regional centers, and it helps them concentrate the resources of their 
respective regions, particularly human resources. In general, the key 
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factors of modernization are the size of a city and the concentration 
of human capital there. 
But the modernization potential of Russia One should not be 
overestimated, as the communities in large cities are quite mixed 
demographically and ideologically. For instance, the share of elderly 
who heavily depend on the authorities is large (30–33 percent in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg). The middle class in large cities is also a 
mixed bag; during the 2000s, the share of bureaucrats, security and 
police officers, and other public-sector employees (school principals, 
hospital chiefs, and so forth) grew rapidly. In their case, modern-
ization has been limited to higher consumption standards, whereas 
their values remained statist and antiliberal and their demand for 
modernization of institutions minimal. 
About 9 percent of Russians live in cities with populations of 
between a quarter million and a half million people, primarily in 
regional capitals. In Russia, the capital status of a city makes its social 
and economic development more sustainable, but its human and 
financial resources are usually inadequate for modernization. This is 
an intermediate zone between Russia One and Russia Two, with the 
situation varying by the city. 
“Russia Two” refers to medium-sized cities with populations from 
50,000 to 250,000 people. They are home to less than 30 percent 
of Russia’s population. Not all of these cities retained their industrial 
specialization during the post-Soviet times, but Soviet-era values still 
hold strong. In addition to considerable employment in the indus-
trial sector, these cities have a large number of people employed in 
the public sector, most of whom are less-skilled workers. 
The economic situation varies across the cities of Russia Two: the 
highest incomes are enjoyed by residents of oil- and gas-producing 
cities in the Tyumen Oblast, and incomes are also somewhat higher 
in cities with large steel and coal industry enterprises—that is, 
in cities with export-oriented economies. In cities with export- 
substitution industries (machine building, the food industry, and 
so forth), wages are considerably lower than in the regional cen-
ters. Young people have been fleeing Russia Two for regional centers 
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where they work or study, and in most cases, they never come back. 
Economic crises are particularly hard on one-company cities. 
There are more than 150 of these, and they account for 10 percent 
of the country’s urban population. During the last economic crisis 
in 2009, the central authorities financed mass-scale public works, 
primarily on the premises of the gorodoobrazyushchie enterprises 
(around which one-company cities and towns were built), to main-
tain employment. Yet a ban on layoffs and on enterprise shutdowns 
prevented the problem of inefficient employment from being solved. 
In 2013, economic stagnation brought that problem to the fore again. 
The denizens of Russia Two, like the residents of the largest cit-
ies, have not been happy with the political situation in this country. 
During the 2011 parliamentary elections, the share of votes cast in 
favor of the ruling party (United Russia) in many industrial cities was 
as low as in large regional centers (29–38 percent). However, during 
the presidential elections, Russia Two residents voted for Putin 
because, more than anything else, they valued stability, employment, 
and wages and remembered well the 1990s, when enterprises would 
remain idle for long periods of time while workers would go unpaid 
for months on end. 
The main reason for Russia Two to protest is the loss of jobs and 
wages. The liberal ideas of modernization are unpopular; the great-
est value is a strong paternalist state and large-scale social policy. The 
residents of industrial Russia feel like they are the main “providers” 
for Russia; therefore, the Kremlin’s spin doctors have managed to 
pit the hardworking populace of Russia Two against the residents of 
Russia One who, in the language of the official propaganda, “only 
wag their tongues and produce nothing.” The existence of a political 
rift is confirmed by the outcome of the presidential elections. In the 
Urals, during the 2012 presidential race, Putin garnered twice as 
much support as United Russia received there in the parliamentary 
election in 2011. 
“Russia Three” is the traditionalist and very inert rural heartland 
of most of Russia’s regions, as well as the communities in villages 
and small towns with a population of less than 20,000 (collectively, 
26   PUTIN’S RUSSIA 
more than one-third of this country’s population). In these cities, the 
levels of education and mobility are at their lowest; the public sector 
and agriculture provide most of the jobs; and a large share of those 
employed are in the “informal,” or shadow, sector. The periphery is 
apolitical and always votes for the incumbent authorities. In addi-
tion, Russia Three has been suffering from depopulation. 
The borders between the three Russias are blurred. Obviously, the 
distribution of the population is not the only factor affecting the pace 
of modernization, but the center-periphery model helps identify the 
key differences.
“Russia Four” is yet another periphery, which comprises the 
underdeveloped republics of the North Caucasus (5 percent of 
Russia’s total population) and the south of Siberia (less than 1 per-
cent). These regions differ greatly from the rest of Russia because 
they are at an earlier stage of the modernization transition: urban-
ization began later, the demographic transition is incomplete, 
birth rates remain high, the patriarchal clan-based structure of 
society persists, ethnic differences are acute, and religion plays an 
important role. 
The rural population is still young, cities have yet to digest the 
growing migration from the rural areas, and the urban way of life 
is only just taking shape there. The modernized, urban population 
is too slow to expand, because a fairly large part of the educated 
and competitive young people are moving to the country’s largest 
cities. Internally, Russia Four is not homogeneous either: for exam-
ple, the more urbanized North Ossetia and Adygeya, with predom-
inantly Russian populations, differ in degree of modernization from 
Chechnya, with its totalitarian regime.    
Divergent Factors. The center-periphery differences are typical 
of other countries, particularly those that are catching up in their 
development. In Russia, these differences have their own specific 
features: 
• A wide gap between the largest cities and the rest of Russia. 
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• Considerable differences in social and economic development 
among midsized industrial cities geared toward exports and 
those catering to the domestic market.
• Vast expanses of a deteriorating and depopulating ethnic Rus-
sian periphery. 
This division into four Russias is based on long-term factors and 
is very durable, with differences changing very slowly. During the 
economic boom of the 2000s, the highest rates of growth in incomes 
and consumption standards were enjoyed by the residents of the 
largest cities, where the better-paying jobs and the better-educated 
population are concentrated. Rapid consumption modernization 
has helped modernize the way of life and the set of values held by 
the population of the major cities in Russia One. The consumer 
modernization impetus gradually proliferated from the largest cities 
to the smaller ones. The 2009 crisis had a stronger impact on the 
medium-sized industrial cities of Russia Two. On the whole, the gap 
between Russia One and Russia Two widened in the 2000s. 
Postimperial Syndrome: The Four Russias Choice
Until recently, it seemed that Russian nationalism and xenopho-
bia were emerging as Russia’s main risks. These phenomena have 
been gaining ground since the mid-1990s, and the authorities have 
encouraged them since the late 2000s in an attempt to strengthen 
their positions. The result was growing nationalism among ethnic 
minorities leading to social destabilization, which the authorities 
ignored. These tendencies are still relevant but have temporarily 
receded, giving way to a different, more powerful way of mobilizing 
public support—the promotion of a postimperial syndrome.
The phantom pains and frustration after the breakup of the USSR 
were present in Russian society throughout the entire post-Soviet 
period, even as nostalgia was wearing off. In 2014, the postimpe-
rial syndrome was converted from its latent form into the current 
open one with the assistance of powerful anti-Ukrainian and anti- 
Western propaganda. The annexation of Crimea enjoyed massive 
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public support, and Putin’s popularity rating jumped from 60 to 82 
percent between January and March 2014. In addition to increased 
support, the authorities now have an opportunity to attribute the 
worsening economic situation to malicious designs of foreign ene-
mies. The rising tide of flag waving allows for a tighter policy toward 
domestic opposition, whom the president has called “national trai-
tors.”2 Political gains which help strengthen the regime are obvious. 
Anti-Western sentiments prevail across all four Russias, and res-
toration of the empire is generally viewed favorably. Survey results 
suggest that the modernized layer of the urban population espousing 
European values and rationally perceiving the world is scarce even in 
the largest cities of Russia. Consumption modernization has not yet 
changed what Douglass North called “supra-constitutional” values.3
It is unlikely that the post-Soviet imperial syndrome will be over-
come during the next 10–15 years. Not only has nostalgia for the 
USSR survived in the minds of the older generations, but also the 
imperial myth is being successfully reproduced in the minds of 
Russia’s younger people. The period of abrupt intensification of flag 
waving cannot last long, but support for Putin’s policy of, to use the 
regime’s official language, “in-gathering of the Russian lands” is here 
to stay for a long time as a value choice made by most Russians, no 
matter where they live. 
The 2014 Crisis and the Four Russias:  
Impact and Consequences
The Russian economy plunged into a recession even before the onset 
of the crisis in Ukraine. In 2013, there was no growth in industrial 
output or investment, and 2014 saw the beginning of a serious eco-
nomic downturn. The growth of household incomes in 2013 was 
minimal (3 percent) and largely stemmed from wage increases in 
the public sector. The fiscal position of the nation’s regions is dete-
riorating because of a reduced tax rate and shrinking transfers from 
the federal budget. The declining fiscal revenues notwithstanding, 
the regions have to implement Putin’s decrees to raise public-sector 
wages. As a result, 77 out of 83 regions are running fiscal deficits. 
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In the aggregate, the budget spending by the regions was 8 percent 
higher than their revenues. Russia’s budget is becoming unsustain-
able, as the regions’ debt reached 2 trillion rubles (31 percent of 
their own revenue net of the transfers from the federal budget). The 
regions will be forced to cut expenditures, mainly the number of 
social-sector institutions and their employees. 
The impact of the economic woes on the four Russias varies. The 
underdeveloped republics (Russia Four) did not notice the 2009 
economic crisis and are unlikely to notice a new one, since they live 
mostly off transfers from the federal budget and the shadow econ-
omy. The share of these republics in the total transfers to the regions 
of the Russian Federation is only 10 percent. The federal budget can 
afford to continue supporting them.
The peripheral Russia Three is also outside the risk zone. It has 
the largest share of pensioners, and older people are more loyal and 
manageable even if the rate of pension increases slows down. In 
rural areas and smaller cities, the share of public-sector and agricul-
tural employees is higher. Wages in the public sector have increased, 
while the agricultural sector will likely become more competitive on 
the back of a weaker ruble and declining imports. 
The industrial cities of Russia Two have been more deeply affected 
by the economic crisis, particularly hubs of the steel, coal, paper and 
pulp, and engineering industries, in which output began to decline 
in 2013. So far, big and medium-sized businesses have been very 
careful in their layoff policies because of pressure from the federal 
and regional authorities, but as the crisis exacerbates, the problem of 
unemployment will grow more urgent. It may be mitigated to some 
extent as the federal budget has allocated considerable resources to 
prop up employment (more than 100 billion rubles in 2014, or 20 
percent more than at the peak of the crisis in 2009). But this will 
help only if the crisis is short lived, which is unlikely given the many 
institutional flaws of the Russian economy and recent international 
sanctions in response to Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis. 
Russia Two is headed for high unemployment and a drop in living 
standards. At the same time, it should be taken into account that 
the populations in the industrial cities in the central, northwestern, 
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and Urals regions have grown older: most of the workers are close 
to retirement age, which reduces pressure on the labor market. 
Wide protests are unlikely, since the population of Russia Two is less 
educated and will be more easily convinced by the all-out Kremlin 
propaganda campaign blaming the country’s economic problems on 
scheming foreign enemies. 
One-company monotowns are the most vulnerable to the effects 
of an economic crisis, but a massive public outcry can hardly be 
expected there. Russia’s big businesses have learned how to lower 
social costs through management tools (like shorter working weeks, 
mandatory unpaid leaves, minimization of layoffs, reassignment of 
workers to other tasks within a company if certain shops have to 
be closed down, firing protest leaders, and a de facto actual ban on 
strikes) and to extract the most benefit from government support 
for employment. A rather effective alliance between the federal and 
regional authorities and big business has evolved in Russia, seeking 
to minimize social protest in industrial cities where large companies 
have their assets. The medium-sized businesses in monotowns are 
more vulnerable because the risks of shuttering undermodernized 
enterprises are higher. (During the 2009 crisis, regional authorities 
forbade owners of medium-sized businesses to close down unprofit-
able enterprises, making them work at a loss or sell to new owners; 
they also forced other companies in the region to buy products from 
struggling businesses.)
In Russia One, the creeping crisis (or, rather, slow recession) is 
currently not perceived as an acute problem, but the situation will 
inevitably grow worse. People in the major cities boast the highest 
level of education, incomes, and consumption standards and thus 
have a great deal to lose. The labor market is gradually adjusting 
to the worsening conditions by freezing wages in the private sector 
and slowly reducing employment, while households have employed 
various adaptation strategies. For the bureaucrats, who account for 
a sizable proportion of the middle class in large cities, the negative 
impact of the crisis is absorbed by higher wages and corruption rent. 
Emigration remains an option for competitive professionals who are 
not willing to adjust to the new political reality. 
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As the crisis deepens, the residents of Russia’s largest cities will be 
able to shake off the postimperial syndrome sooner and more ratio-
nally evaluate the consequences of the Putin regime’s antimoderniza-
tion policies. But whether Russia One has the strength to protest and 
what the forms and scope of opposition to the Kremlin’s policies will 
be is an open question. 
Scenarios for the Four Russias
Negative political changes in Russia are so swift that predicting any-
thing is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, the general direction of the 
Putin regime is clear: antimodernization and isolationism. The only 
question is the depth and longevity of the trend. The new trend in 
the Russian state’s policies has many historical precedents: revolu-
tions have always been followed by periods of counterrevolutions 
and attempts to restore old development models. In the case of 
today’s Russia, the antimodernization, counterrevolutionary trend 
is aggravated by the postimperial syndrome. One can think of four 
development scenarios.
Back to USSR/Sliding toward Totalitarianism. This scenario 
involves switching to the “besieged fortress” mode and tighten-
ing the political regime for quite a long time to come. This sce-
nario implies greater control over big business under the threat of 
nationalization and its subordination to the political interests of the 
authorities, a mobilization-ready economy, ideological control over 
key aspects of life, restrictions on foreign travel, large-scale reprisals 
against the opposition and liquidation of the remaining indepen-
dent media outlets, and restrictions on the Internet. This likely will 
lead to a sharp drop in the living standards of the entire population, 
particularly the middle class in the larger cities who are not part of 
the bureaucracy. Such a scenario no longer appears implausible, but 
it is more likely to materialize in the event of a full-scale Russian 
military invasion of eastern Ukraine and the introduction of sweep-
ing Western sanctions as a response. 
Should this scenario materialize, its implications for the four 
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Russias are easy to predict. The larger cities of Russia One would be 
hit the hardest, and their population would have to sharply lower 
their consumption standards. Resistance is unlikely to be broad-
based in the repressive environment, but the modernized middle 
class would leave the country in droves. The differences between 
Russia One and the other Russias would become smaller because of 
the shrinking modernization potential of the largest cities. 
The authorities would try to mitigate the negative consequences 
for the industrial Russia Two, which is the Putin regime’s political 
base. Budget-funded government contracts would increase, and so 
would support for employment in industrial cities. 
Russia Three is another base of support for the regime, but in its 
case, the authorities may limit themselves to maintaining the level 
of pensions and wages for public-sector employees. The country’s 
outlying areas are incapable of protest and have always voted as 
expected. Under this scenario, the regime may remain stable over 
the medium term, while its more distant future would depend on 
the speed and depth of the economic crisis, which will inevitably 
worsen even if energy prices do not fall. As a result, Russia would 
lose almost all of its competitive advantages, except for commodities, 
and would find itself in the group of less-developed countries. 
Hard Authoritarianism. Barring a full-scale invasion of eastern 
Ukraine, this is the most probable scenario. The prevailing anti-
modernization trend with the imitation of Soviet practices and 
pinpoint reprisals against protest leaders will continue. The busi-
ness community would demonstrate loyalty in exchange for per-
mission to keep their assets, and no considerable nationalization 
of the economy would take place. The living standards would 
decline, but not too rapidly. Under this scenario, the educated 
population of the larger cities of Russia One espousing modern 
values would self-isolate, withdrawing into “internal emigration” 
(a passive form of protest), with just a few small groups of active 
protesters remaining. Emigration would occur on a lesser scale 
but would be enough to undermine the modernization potential 
of Russia’s largest cities. 
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Under this scenario, the authorities would also rely on the conser-
vatism of the industrial and still-Soviet Russia Two and the peripheral 
Russia Three, but it might prove to be a less stable political support 
than the regime would hope for: after the annexation of Crimea, the 
mobilization resources based on the postimperial syndrome could be 
exhausted and the level of political support for the authorities would 
decline because of economic problems. The Russian authorities then 
are quite likely to encourage ethnic (Great Russia, orthodox) mobili-
zation and xenophobia toward migrants as a new source of support 
for the regime which would inevitably exacerbate tensions in Russia 
Four in the North Caucasus.
In addition to the republics of the Caucasus, the cities of Russia 
One where the bulk of migrant workers are concentrated and the cit-
ies and rural areas of the Russian south where the influx of migrants 
is also massive would become a problem zone. The consequences 
of growing Russian and ethnic nationalisms are impossible to pre-
dict, and pumping up xenophobia might lead to disintegration of 
the country as the worst-case scenario. Although the imperial idea 
unites most of the Russian citizens, albeit temporarily, the national 
one is sharply divisive. 
Returning to the Modernization Path after a Short Relapse of the 
Postimperial Syndrome. This may happen only if the elites split 
up and later reach an agreement to alter the country’s direction and 
replace the leader, which is unlikely. Even if the course of leadership 
is changed, it would be difficult to start modernizing institutions 
and to loosen the state’s authoritarian grip on business and society. 
Regrettably, during the post-Soviet period, particularly under Putin, 
all the institutions of society, as well as human and social capital, 
have deteriorated. A change of course in the context of a protracted 
economic crisis would lead to temporary loss of control and chaotic 
decentralization. This is virtually inevitable at the stage of abandon-
ing strict authoritarianism. 
In this scenario, Russia Two would lose state support; its pop-
ulation would protest but would do so warily because of the low 
social capital of the industrial cities’ population and a limited ability 
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to act collectively. Russia Three would adjust to the changes using 
traditional survival techniques (for example, subsidiary farming, 
picking mushrooms and wild berries, or fishing). Russia One would 
continue to be the leader of change, but at a much lower level of 
social and human capital in the largest cities, which would limit the 
modernization potential. 
This potential is further diminished by the fact that the Russian 
authorities have raised institutional barriers that would impede the 
progress of Russia One. Thus, a law has been passed abolishing direct 
mayoral elections in the country’s 67 largest cities (excluding the fed-
eral centers) to prevent opposition candidates from being elected. In 
2012, gubernatorial elections were reinstated, but with a system of 
filters to prevent the opposition from entering the races. This will 
enhance the legitimacy of governors, but within the regions the sys-
tem in which strong mayors of the largest cities counterbalance the 
regional governors will be destroyed. In the context of weakening 
federal authority, such an imbalance would facilitate the emergence 
of authoritarian regional regimes. 
To bring this country together, the new Russian authorities would 
again take a step toward authoritarianism. Russia would again fall in 
the same pit, confirming the relevance of the path-dependence the-
ory that explains how development is limited by the system of values 
prevailing in society.4 These are informal norms and rules deeply 
rooted in the life of nations and linked to the behavioral stereotypes 
of large population groups, which makes them stronger than formal 
institutions (laws). 
Forcibly Toppling the Existing Regime through Revolution. This 
is the least likely scenario. The main role under this scenario would 
be played by Russia One—or, rather, the nation’s capital—but the 
outlines of such a scenario are not discernible for the time being, and 
its consequences are too harrowing to even contemplate. 
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Conclusion 
In the post-Crimea political environment, Russia One is an obvi-
ous loser. It cannot strengthen its influence on the nation’s develop-
ment by introducing innovative values and diffusing them through 
the hierarchy of cities. Under the more likely future scenarios, the 
authorities would isolate Russia One and rely on the conservative 
semiperiphery and periphery (Russias Two and Three). 
Interactions between Russia One and Russia Two are unlikely 
under any scenario, as their interests diverge in the short and 
medium term: the residents in major cities are keen to see modern-
ization of the state, while Russia Two values social and economic 
stability (employment and wages) above anything else. 
The problems of Russia Four heighten the risks associated with 
Russia’s development under all scenarios. Under the harshest sce-
nario, these problems may be temporarily frozen with the help of 
government-sponsored violence, but that would increase develop-
ment risks further into the future. 
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